Agri-cooperatives play an important role in helping resource-poor farmers reach high-value 2 markets. In addition to linking smallholders to markets, cooperatives provide their members 3 with various services, such as extension, credit, input subsidies, and social programmes. While 4 the literature contains many examples of success, there has been limited discussion on the often 5 long and turbulent process by which cooperatives develop over time and the viable options for 6
shortcuts. This study examines four emerging cocoa cooperatives in Peru to determine their 7 overall business viability, the key factors that advanced their development, and their capacity to 8 address the needs of their members. Our findings suggest that strategies for supporting 9 cooperative development have largely failed to address major internal weaknesses and the 10 challenges posed in the external environment. The cooperatives have received time-bound, 11 uncoordinated, and often small-scale, interventions, which have focused on infrastructure 12 expansion and technical assistance. Important areas related to business management and 13 governance structures, trust relationships with buyers, and sufficient working capital have 14 largely been ignored. Shortcuts may be achieved through improvements in access to business 15 development and financial services, deeper engagement by private sector to support the 16 development process, and commitment by stakeholders to monitoring and critical reflection for 17 strategy refinement. 18 19 20 Key words: cooperatives, business performance, rural development, NGOs , cocoa  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39 3   1  2  Introduction  3 Strong agri-cooperatives can play an important role in helping resource-poor farmers reach high 4 value markets, such as those for certified coffee and cocoa. These markets typically offer 5 attractive prices and more secure buyer relationships, but require that smallholders commit to 6 deliver pre-identified volumes on time and in the required form and quality. Cooperatives 7 realise economies of scale in processing and marketing and provide advisory and other services 8 to help their members respond to buyer demands. Such services include technical assistance, 9 training, and input and credit provision. Cooperatives also manage relations with downstream 10 buyers, certification agencies, governmental entities, NGOs, as well as with farmers, who must 11 perceive benefits from their participation. Many NGOs and governments support cooperative 12 development because of its potential to help achieve poverty reduction and encourage 13 members' sense of empowerment through stronger links to markets. Cooperatives are also 14 considered to be effective options for advancing conservation goals (Kruijssen et al. 2009 ), 15 promoting products of cultural and economic importance (Devaux et . These studies present cases of one or more 23 mature cooperatives engaged in an export market, which overcame adversity to evolve into a 24 business organization able to offer attractive marketing terms and provide additional services to 25 their members. Success is often attributed to external support, a strong market orientation, and 26 the consolidation of democratic governance structures. Studies have also confirmed that 27 cooperative development tends to involve considerable resources and development processes 28 over prolonged periods, even under favourable external conditions (Donovan, Stoian and Poole  29 2008, Poole and de Frece 2010). Frequently, the process is marked by periods of growth 30 followed by crises due to incompetence, corruption or bad luck, leading to prolonged periods of 31 limited activity or dissolution (Kachule, Poole and Dorward 2005) . Important questions remain 32 about how to reduce the high costs and risks associated with building cooperatives into viable 33
businesses. This implies an explicit strategy for supporting less-mature, or emerging 34 cooperatives, which have weaker member fidelity and governance structures, smaller market 35 volumes and fewer buyers, and may receive less support from governments and NGOs. 36
In Peru, government agencies and NGOs have considered cocoa cooperatives to be important 37 partners in expanding the country's cocoa sector and have carried out numerous interventions 38 and programmes in support of cooperative development (del Castillo 2013). This study explores 1 the circumstances facing four emerging cocoa cooperatives in San Martin, Peru-the largest 2 cocoa producing department in the country. Despite having been organized for 10 years or 3 longer, they have yet to reach a critical 'take-off' point: in respect of membership number, level 4 of capital endowment and buyer contacts they are still 'emerging', unlike the more consolidated 5 group of cooperatives in Peru or elsewhere in Latin America. Section 'Cooperative assessment 6 framework' provides a brief overview of debates surrounding organizational performance and 7 introduces the framework for the assessment of the emerging cooperatives that was applied in 8 this study. Section 'Case study background' provides an overview of the cocoa sector in Peru. 9
Section 'Methodology' explains the methods used for data collection. Section 'Results' presents 10 the results of the assessment. The paper ends with a discussion of the implications of the 11 findings for the design of strategies to better support cooperatives, including potential shortcuts 12 for achieving sustainable cooperative development. 13 14 15
Cooperative assessment framework 16 Researchers have long recognized the "dual nature" of cooperatives-a result of being both a 17 member-controlled organization and subject to economic constraints similar to those of other 18 enterprises. However, developing-country cooperatives that are engaged in high value markets, 19 in addition to building appropriate governance structures, must often provide long-term 20 support, such as technical assistance, technology development, and credit, to their members 21 ). In many cases, cooperatives may represent the only source of support for 22 resource-poor members looking to expand their production and respond to stringent quality 23 requirements. The costs for service provision often are covered partially through subsidies 24 provided by projects, government agencies, and, in some cases, downstream buyers. In this 25 way, cooperatives have taken on a role similar to that of NGOs. At the same time, cooperatives 26 must build a successful business in an altogether difficult environment, from paying taxes and 27 competing with local buyers for raw material, to engaging with various buyers, service 28 providers, and support organizations. Below, we briefly review the discussion on performance 29 assessment for businesses and NGOs and then present a framework for assessment of 30 cooperatives. 31 32 Assessing cooperative performance 33
Researchers have applied financial-based metrics to study the performance of agri-cooperatives 34 in North America and Europe, based on the underlying assumption that cooperatives are a 35 variant of investor-owned firms. These studies assess performance (e.g. liquidity, solvency and 36 efficiency) based on financial ratios, where differences in ratios reflect differences in goals and 37 related strategies (e.g. 1. evaluation of financial performance, through interviews with managers, key employees, 7 and accountants 8 2. governance structures, through focus group meetings with the board of directors, and 9 semi-structured interviews with managers, cooperative employees, buyers, support 10 agencies, government officials, and second-tier organizations 11 3. cooperative membership through structured interviews 12 13 The member households were selected using a stratified random sampling method 14 corresponding to the geographic distribution of the members and weighted for gender to 15 ensure women were deliberately selected. Internal governance: Coop1's manager operates with little oversight from the board. The 8 manager alone conducts the financial planning for the cooperative and has developed the 9 strategic and operational plans, which the board approved without providing any inputs. To 10 support the cooperative's transition to a viable enterprise, the regional government has paid the 11 manager's salary, thus allowing for the manager to potentially have divided loyalties between 12 the government and members. Several members and the board of directors indicated during the 13 interviews and focus group that they trust the manager's capacity to lead the cooperative, 14 despite the manager having little formal training in business management. Much of the 15 members' trust in the manager is based on interactions when the manager served as an 16 agricultural extensionist in the community. The board of directors lacks the business acumen to 17 evaluate the manager's recommendations and provide strategic guidance. The board members 18 readily admitted that they do not understand the cooperative's financial statements. 19
Member relations: Coop1 membership is primarily comprised of indigenous tribes (90%) whose 20 primary livelihood activity is fishing. Since the peak fishing time coincides with the cocoa 21 harvest, they tend to have limited labour available for managing cocoa plantations, which has 22 impacted the productivity of the farms. In Coop1, the members' cocoa plantations are the least 23 productive of the four sampled cooperatives, with output at 565 MT of cocoa per hectare on 24 average. Nearly all members stated that their engagement with Coop1 was motivated by the 25 perceived benefits from the services Coop1 provides. In 2015, Coop1 offered technical 26 assistance, organic certification, payment advances and organic fertilizer. Members expressed a 27 sense of loyalty to Coop1 because of their long history of interacting with the cooperative. The 1 members on average had belonged to the Coop1 for nine years-roughly twice the average 2 length of membership in the other cooperatives, extending back to when the farmers began 3 growing cocoa. Coop1 provided 96% of the farmers with the resources to establish their cocoa 4 plantations. 5
Infrastructure, machinery, and tools: In 2012, Coop1 constructed seven collection centres 6 supplied by the smaller, neighbouring communities to dry and ferment cocoa. These 7 investments have lowered transportation costs by providing centralized collection points and 8 have allowed Coop1 to ensure high quality product. PDA and the regional government provided 9 nearly all the material at a cost of around 225,000 USD for construction. In addition, the regional 10 and local government donated the land for the collection centres. The only property purchased 11 by the cooperative with its own funds is its administrative office, which is valued at around 12 12,000 USD. In 2014, Coop1 received donations from the anti-drug agency of the Peruvian 13 government to purchase chocolate-making equipment worth about 23,000 USD. The machinery 14 has yet to be used. The rest of the operational equipment used by the cooperative, computers, 15 electric scales, a motorcycle, and cocoa quality measuring tools were purchased using a loan of 16 4,500 USD provided to the cooperative from its first buyer in 2011. 17
Buyer relations: Since Coop1 began selling cocoa it has sold to two large brokers and Coop2. 18
Relations between Coop1 and one if its brokers terminated when Coop1 failed to fully repay the 19 buyer-provided loan in 2011. The cooperative still sells cocoa to the remaining broker, although 20 the broker has voiced frustration with Coop1 in failing to meet deadlines and delivery quotas. 21
However, the buyer prefers to purchase cocoa from cooperatives, as the middlemen are even 22 less trustworthy and supply poor quality cocoa. Coop1 does not have certification and has faced 23 a disadvantage of competing with local intermediaries in the low margin commodity market. 24 However, starting in late 2015, it was expected to be able to market UTZ certified cocoa, as the 25 farmers will have completed the four-year transition period. In the focus group interviews, the 26 board of directors of Coop1 expressed hope that their ability to obtain price premiums from 27 certified cocoa would allow them to fully cover their costs and pay members higher prices. 28
Financial assets: The regional government pays the salary of the manager and accountant and 29 PDA also pays for the extensionists, organic certification, and organic fertilizers provided to the 30 farmers. External funding was so critical to Coop1's survival that it stopped buying cocoa for a 31 period in 2013 when these funds were temporarily unavailable. Coop1 faces difficulties to 32 service its outstanding debt of nearly 400,000 USD. Cocoa buyers provide Coop1 with much of 33 its operational capital, which is repaid when the cooperative delivers cocoa to the buyer. In 34 2010, Coop1 received a loan from a long-time buyer, but chose to sell its cocoa to an 35 intermediary that offered a higher price, never paying back the original loan of 195,000 USD. It 36 has only been able to pay the interest on this original loan. Since then, Coop1 has taken out a 37 loan in 2013 worth 125,000 USD from the other international buyer, which it has since repaid. In 38 2014, it received three loans totalling 189,000 USD. One worth 34,000 USD was provided by an 1 NGO, another for 38,000 USD was from Coop2, and the third was given from a local lending 2 agency for 117,000 USD. To help repay its delinquent loan to the international buyer, Coop1 was 3 considering selling its administrative office that it owned, the rest of its infrastructure having 4 been given in concession. 5 6 Coop2 7
Internal governance: Over the last three years, Coop2 has gone from near bankruptcy to 8 exporting cocoa with plans to become profitable in a year or two. According to its members, 9 board of directors, local governmental officials, the fortunes of Coop2 changed in 2012 when 10 the cooperative hired a new manager who had experience working in one of the largest cocoa 11 cooperatives in San Martín. Because of this history, the members of Coop2 trust the business 12 judgement of the manager. Even though the cooperative has a capable board of directors, which 13 included a retired teacher, a banker, and a former extension provider, almost all the 14 recommendations made by the manager are accepted; and he makes all the operating 15 decisions. The board knows that the membership will back the manager in any disagreement. 16 The manager feels like he has taken the role of 'training' the board members in their roles and 17 how to run a cooperative. This reality of a mentor/mentee relationship has made the 18 cooperative heavily dependent on the manager. 19
Member relations: Following a financial crisis (see discussion on financial assets), the manager 20 insisted that the cooperative generate sizable revenue streams before investing in social 21
programmes. However, this plan was not well received by members. Some believed that since 22 the cooperative experienced improved financial conditions it should invest in services and pay 23 dividends, even though Coop2 remained unable to recover costs without external subsidies. In 24 fact, 47% of the membership in Coop2 thought it needed to provide more services, which was 25 nearly double the response, 24% of the membership, in the other three cooperatives. The 26 manager and president of the board of directors explained that one of their greatest challenges 27 was helping the members understand the financial statements. Despite concerns over benefit 28 distribution, none of the members interviewed in Coop2 planned to leave (between 10% and 29 20% of the members in the other cooperatives were planning on leaving). Coop2 by donors, PDA and local governmental institutions, was five collection centres in the 1 villages at a cost of nearly 65,000 USD. However, the fermentation bins built in these centres 2 were poorly constructed and rotted within a few years of being built. Now, Coop2 is diverting a 3 portion of its income to rebuild these centres. The administrative and warehouse building is 4 small, which limits its ability to purchase larger volumes of cocoa. Since it rents the building, it 5 has no incentive to expand and improve it. The only renovation the cooperative undertook was 6 to replace a leaky roof. It lacks the assets it needs to transport the cocoa from the buying station 7 to its warehouse. It only owns a cargo motorcycle and an off-road motorcycle, bought with its 8 own funds at a cost of nearly 5,000 USD. The municipal government provided the rest of the 9 equipment, computers and other office machines and laboratory tools, at a cost of nearly 10 25,000 USD. 11
Buyer relations: The previous manager did not have well-established relationships with the 12 buyers, which limited his ability to enter into contracts with the buyers. At one point Coop2 had 13 its warehouse full but had failed to establish timely contracts with buyers to provide the money 14 it needed to finance its loans. It nearly defaulted on its loans even though the value of the cocoa 15 in store was more than enough to cover its payments. The cooperative now has developed 16 strong relations with buyers and creditors, which has created the level of trust they need to 17 work with Coop2. All the buyers interviewed explained the main motive for buying from Coop2 18 was that they trusted the manager. The largest buyer of the cooperative explained that even 19 though the cooperative did not always meet contract deadlines the manager communicated 20 well and could be counted on to eventually deliver the product. This difference in the 21 relationship the cooperative had with its buyers was a principal factor in why the cooperative is 22 now financially stable. 23
Financial assets: Coop2's inability to sell cocoa combined with high interest loans from local 24 credit institutions to secure working capital proved nearly fatal. Coop2's first loan in 2010 was 25 from a local credit union for 40,000 USD. However, the cooperative defaulted on this loan in 26 2011. The former manager and president of the board of directors took out formal loans in their 27 own name in 2011 of nearly 10,000 USD (3% monthly interest rate) to cover operating expenses. 28
When the new manager took over, he secured informal loans, which added up to nearly 20,000 29 USD for 6 months (5% monthly interest rate). The manager also worked to have the 2010 loan 30 refinanced; however, the 2011 loan taken out by the previous manager was no longer 31 recognized by the cooperative. By 2013 access to finance improved when credit was obtained 32 from three of the cooperative's largest buyers for a total of nearly 200,000 USD without 33 interest, which was repaid in cocoa. By 2014, having paid back the buyer-provided loans, the 34 cooperative gained access to international lenders, securing 100,000 USD with an 11% annual 35 interest rate. Coop2 has also greatly increased the amount of cocoa it markets from 130 metric 36 tons in 2012 to 425 metric tons in 2014. In fact, in 2014 it made a profit of 250,000 USD (from a 37 loss of 10,000 USD in 2010), which was used to pay for organic certification and eliminate past 38 debts. 39 1
Coop3 2
Internal governance: Coop3 stopped purchasing cocoa at the end of 2014. It started purchasing 3 cocoa again in mid-2015 after replacing its management and leadership. The NGO that has 4 supported the cooperative and its major buyer demanded the manager be changed as a 5 condition of maintaining a relationship with the cooperative. The membership also chose a new 6 board that no longer consisted exclusively of farmers but was made up mostly of teachers from 7 the local school. The members hope that the new directors would be able to provide greater 8 oversight and guidance to the manager. The board of directors basically manages the 9 cooperative and has been integral in establishing operational procedures. The board has taken 10 charge of external relations with funders, and participates in the strategic planning of the 11 cooperative. The new manager is not from the community nor has worked there. Even though 12 he understands the Peruvian cocoa industry, he lacks the social capital necessary to engage 13 effectively with members: management-member relations are effectively governed not by the 14 manager but by the board. 15
Member relations: The manager and board of directors admit that the cooperative needs to 16 build trust first with its members and second with the buyers and the institutions that support it 17 in order to become sustainable. Some of the members interviewed in remote communities were 18 unaware that Coop3 remained active in the cocoa sector. Even with all the recent problems, 19 84% of the members interviewed still planned to participate and sell to the cooperative once it 20 started buying again. The members felt that the cooperative paid higher prices, so it was in their 21 interest to sell to it when they had the opportunity. There was a general expectation that the 22 cooperative would be successful now that the cooperative had new leadership, even 23 anticipating that the cooperative will soon be exporting. One common member comment was 24 that "…with the new board of directors and manager, things are going to change". 25
Infrastructure, machinery, and tools: Coop3 possessed facilities to process up to 50 metric tons 26 of cocoa a month, more than twice the capacity it marketed in 2014. The local government gave 27 the cooperative the building and land. The post-harvesting infrastructure in the headquarters 28 and three collection facilities in the outlying communities were provide by grants from the local 29 and national governments and PDA totalling 75,000 USD with an additional 5,000 USD provided 30 by its members. The scales and cargo motorcycle worth 3,000 USD were provided by the 31 national and local governments. PDA gave Coop3 11,000 USD worth of chocolate making 32 equipment that it has used only infrequently. 33
Buyer relations: Since Coop3 has been selling cocoa in 2012, it has sold to six buyers. In 2014, it 34 sold 200 metric tons of cocoa to a national buyer and 10 metric tons to a specialized organic 35 trader. The cooperative is trying to re-establish relationships with some of its earlier buyers. 36 However, buyers are waiting to see if Coop3's new management can be trusted in ensuring the 37 cooperative meets its contractual arrangements with its current national buyer, who was the 38 exclusive buyer of the 2015 crop. One of the largest Peruvian cocoa cooperatives, which in 2012 1 was the primary buyer from the cooperative, is assessing Coop3's performance and quality 2 control before entering into a renewed business relationship. Even with these challenges, Coop3 3 has maintained its current buyer, who not only pays a premium for certified cocoa but also pays 4 for the certification. 5
Financial assets: The cooperative in late 2014 had defaulted on nearly 20,000 USD of debt, half 6 of which dated back to 2012. At that time a neighbouring cooperative provided an interest free 7 loan worth nearly 33,000 USD that was supposed to be repaid in cocoa. demonstrated by the fact that even though one buyer explained that it would no longer 20 purchase from Coop4 the manager still said that the cooperative was actively selling cocoa to 21 this trader. The change of management may have also strained these relations, as the former 22 manager made contracts the new manager found disadvantageous. Furthermore, the leadership 23 of the cooperative believes that it can now directly export cocoa and no longer needs to be 24 dependent on the large buyers. So, they have little interest in maintaining and building these 25 relationships. 26
Financial assets: The large amount of support it has received from PDA and the Peruvian 27 government has helped the cooperative maintain financial stability. Nearly all of the staff, 28 except for the accountant, were paid from grants. To cover all these administrative costs, the 29 management estimated that it would need to market 520 MT of cocoa, much more than the 280 30 MT marketed in 2014. The leadership is hopeful that it can meet this target by 2017. Coop4 like 31 the other cooperatives has faced challenges in servicing its debts. Its original loan with a 32 regional credit union to purchase land and help construct its main buildings totalled 115,000 33 USD with a 2% monthly interest rate. In 2013, Coop4 borrowed an additional 18,000 USD from a 34 different credit union with a 2.2% monthly interest rate for working capital. In 2014, a large 35 national coffee and cocoa cooperative lent Coop4 100,000 USD and in 2015 130,000 USD for 36 working capital that would be paid off with cocoa sold to the larger cooperative. In 2014, Coop4 37 was unable to pay off its original loan for its land and buildings and has been working to 38 refinance the loan. Because of the high interest rates, the debt has increased from 115,000 USD 1 in 2012 to 130,000 USD by mid-2015. 2 3
Looking across the cooperatives 4 Figure 3 presents the primary motivation reported by members for joining their cooperative. In 5 some cases, the primary motivation strongly reflected the influence of the external 6 organizations that led the process that established the cooperative. For example, Coop1-where 7 members showed a strong interest in access to production inputs-was started by PDA with the 8 intent to expand smallholder cocoa production. Similarly, organizers of Coop4 explicitly aimed to 9 provide cocoa growers with an alternative to unproductive trading relationships with local 10 buyers, thus the relatively strong interest in better prices. Interestingly, Coop4 is the only case 11 where access to better prices did not feature as the most important reason for cooperative 12 participation, likely reflecting the strong influence of NGOs in promoting cocoa expansion over 13 business development. Furthermore, the cooperatives are likely to face difficulties to change 14 expectations in the near future: the inability of the cooperatives to purchase their members' 15 cocoa ranked as the most important reason for members of Coops 2-4 and the second most 16 important reason for members of Coop1 (Fig. 4) to sell cocoa outside their cooperative. 17 Table 3 contributed to weak partnerships with buyers. Overall, the cooperatives were able to retain 28 members, particularly by offering their members access to services, and in some cases, higher 29 prices than those paid by the intermediaries, and more transparent purchasing practices. 30
However, the cooperatives' dependence on external funding sources will likely challenge their 31 capacity to meet demands over time, at least for services such as technical assistance. Across 32 the cooperatives financial capacities appeared frail. On one hand, they secured funds through 33 buyers and lenders. Contracts with buyers, expanding cocoa production, and overall favourable 34 world cocoa have encouraged lenders to provide credit to the cooperatives, which is used to 35 purchase members' cocoa. On the other hand, the level of credit for operations was insufficient 36 and the cooperatives lacked their own capital, leaving them with limited capacity to purchase 37 members' cocoa. Mature cocoa cooperatives have emerged that are able to provide a range of services for their 12 members, with important implications on rural livelihoods and rural landscapes. They have 13 positioned themselves in global value chains, able to interact over time with international 14 buyers eager for access to certified and otherwise high value cocoa and other commodities. 15 Extensive support from NGOs and donors, and in some cases international buyers, has played an 16 important part in the success of these cooperatives. As noted by Bebbington, Quisbert, and 17 Trujillo (1996) cooperative had a set of strengths and weaknesses, and the precise analysis differed from one 17 organisation to another-with none of them exactly alike. In general, however, the cases 18 analysed here fell way short of meeting performance objectives. These findings reinforce the 19 significance of key elements of cooperative structure and strategy depicted in Figure 1 of 20 human, social, physical and financial enterprise assets: a common performance failing is the 21 difficulties of financial management, which are handled differently by each of the cooperatives. 22 Working capital and access to affordable finance affects capacity to provide advance payments 23 to members and provide services to members over the long term, and thus impacts on 24 stakeholder relationships, particularly members and buyers. It is evident also that the 25 expectations of members vary between the different cooperatives, but whatever part other 26 objectives play in members' participation, the cocoa price matters. Secondly, governance 27 models are a significant performance dimension, in particular the different levels of respective 28 skills and the power relationships between the boards of directors, the management and the 29 membership. The consolidation of governance allows for building good relationships with 30 external buyers in competitive product and finance markets. Finally, trust and good 31 communication are key factors in building bonding social capital. In the face of intense 32 competition from independent cocoa buyers, cooperatives will grow and consolidate their 33 20 Well-qualified leadership is not only necessary to make critical decisions and develop a coherent 34 strategy. The abilities of manager and directors are also important to build good relations with 35 members and with buyers. These cases bring to light the overall lack of business leadership in 36 rural areas and the tendency for leaders to acquire their skills through lengthy learning-by-doing 1 processes, at times supported by training and technical assistance interventions. All the buyers 2 commented that a key factor in choosing to do business with a cooperative is their confidence in 3 the manager and to a lesser extent with the board of directors. This relationship with the 4 leadership is so important that it has critically affected the survival of all the cooperatives 5 included in this study. In Peru as in many other markets, there is a relatively small group of 6 businesses that export cocoa. Buyers for these businesses share information on cooperative 7 performance among themselves and are likely to 'blacklist' cooperatives and their managers 8 who have shown to be unreliable business partners. Several cocoa buyers mentioned they would 9 reconsider purchasing cocoa from Coop2 if it changed managers. Coop3's buyer would only 10 continue purchasing from the cooperative once the buyer installed its own manager. The leaders 11 of Coop1 and Coop4 have failed to establish and maintain good business relationships, which has 12 greatly limited their ability to market cocoa. In countries like Peru that have weak institutions, 13 especially weak courts to enforce contract laws, the need for strong relationships between the 14 buyer and the cooperative is even more critical (Hoskisson et al. 2000 This study, carried out in a context where cocoa cooperatives participate in a rapidly growing 36 cocoa sector with considerable competition among local buyers, highlights the need for local 37 stakeholders to investment in the formation of bonding social capital from the beginning of the 38 cooperative development process. . The challenges presented here are relevant in other 39 contexts where efforts in cooperative building are expected to contribute to revitalizing the 1 cocoa sector, for example Papua New Guiana (Garnevska, Joseph and Kingi 2014) and Ghana 2 ). Cooperatives need strong partners along the way who understand their 3 needs and circumstances. Government agencies and NGOs will continue to play a key role; 4 however, there is need for deeper engagement to design monitoring systems with feedback 5 loops for joint reflection and learning. Greater coordination with the private sector is needed to 6 better understand the options for coordinated interventions and joint risk-sharing. For emerging 7 cooperatives, value chain partnerships for building governance and leadership capacities will be 8 critical. A future research and development challenge is to better understand and manage the 9 economic incentives that drive the relationships between buyers and cooperative suppliers in 10 value chains such as cocoa in Peru, in such a way that commercial partners rather than external 11 donors are willing to commit the financial resources that hitherto come from donors and the 12 public sector. Finally, new forms of collaboration, such as cooperative-cooperative business 13 schools, may also work for newly formed cooperatives if more mature cooperatives are willing to 14 share experiences and skills. 15 16 
